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Cloud computing is recently considered as one of the most significant IT trends. Many 
large organizations are interested in cloud computing because of its elasticity, pay per 
use, and other benefits that it provides. However, even with all of its great advantages, 
the security of cloud computing is still in its infancy. Many new attacks have been 
developed especially for the cloud, and the Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) 
attack is one of them. EDoS attacks target the bill of the cloud solution adopter to cause 
economic loss. In this work, we first present a taxonomy of the attacks that target cloud 
computing. Then, we provide a survey for the different types of attacks that can result in 
an EDoS attack.  We also propose a comprehensive taxonomy of the EDoS attacks. 
Finally, we study the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique and evaluate its effectiveness in 
blocking EDoS attacks using an experimental testbed, which is the major contribution of 
this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
 
 ملخص الرسالة
 
 
 سعيد عمر سعيد الصويل الاسم الكامل:
 
 عن طريق الاختبارات العملية dleihS-SoDEتقييم أسلوب الحماية  :عنوان الرسالة
 
 شبكات الحاسوب التخصص:
 
 2013ديسمبر  تاريخ الدرجة العلمية:
 
الحوسبة السحابية من مواضيع تكنولوجيا المعلومات الأكثر رواجاً في الآونة الأخيرة. أثارت الحوسبة السحابية تعد 
لى المميزات الأخرى التي تمتاز بها اهتمام كبرى الشركات لمرونتها، وميزة الدفع المالي بحسب الاستخدام، اضافةً ا
الحوسبة السحابية. ولكن على الرغم من كل مزايا الحوسبة السحابية فإن أمنها يعتبر في مراحله المبكرة. لقد ُصممت 
الكثير من الهجمات الالكترونية خصيصاً لانتهاك أمن الحوسبة السحابية. نركز في هذا البحث على أحد أنواع هذه 
ذي يستهدف استنزاف الجانب المالي للمستفيد من الحوسبة السحابية، وهو ما يعرف بهجوم الهجمات، وال
. في هذا البحث، نقوم أولاً بتصنيف الهجمات الالكترونية ”)SoDE( ytilibaniatsuS fo laineD cimonocE“
للمستفيد من    )SoDE(عن الهجمات التي قد تتسبب في الخسارة المالية  المستهِدفة للحوسبة السحابية، ثم نقدم دراسةً 
. وفي الأخير، نقوم بدراسة أحد SoDEوفي هذه الدراسة أيضاً تصنيف لأنواع هجمات خدمات السحابة الالكترونية. 
 لية عليه واجراء اختبارات عم ، وذلك بتطبيقهdleihS-SoDE، والذي يعرف بـ SoDEأساليب الحماية من هجمات 
، وهو الهدف الأساسي لهذا البحث.SoDEلمعرفة مدى فعاليته في صد هجمات 
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is considered one the most significant IT topics today. Many large 
organizations are interested in cloud computing because of its elasticity, pay per use, and 
other benefits that it provides. However, before getting the full benefit of the cloud, there 
are some issues that have to be resolved first [1]. According to the International Data 
Corporation (IDC), security is considered the greatest challenge of cloud computing [2]. 
Hence, cloud computing security has become a major field of study [3, 4, 5]. 
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are two well-
known security threats in current networks. They intend to make a service unavailable to 
end users by exhausting its computing or network resources.  Christofer Hoff defined a 
new threat that can affect the cloud by transforming a conventional DDoS attack to an 
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack in the cloud [6]. In this case, the EDoS 
attack can be achieved by sending a large amount of undesired traffic towards the cloud 
to exploit its elasticity. The cloud adopter will allocate resources to process this undesired 
traffic. As a result, the adopter will be charged for processing this undesired traffic. This 
will lead to large-scale service withdrawal or bankruptcy.  
In this work, we study the EDoS-Shield which is a mitigation technique used to block the 
EDoS attack targeting cloud computing [15]. The main contribution of this work is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of EDoS-Shield mitigation technique by implementing it using 
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an experimental cloud computing testbed. In addition, we provide a taxonomy for the 
attacks that can target the cloud and a comprehensive survey of the different types of 
attacks that can result in EDoS attacks when applied to cloud computing. Moreover, we 
present a taxonomy for DDoS attacks, since they are considered the main form of attacks 
that can result in EDoS attacks. We also provide a comprehensive taxonomy for the 
EDoS attacks in cloud computing. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
Regardless of its great advantages, the security of cloud computing is still in its infancy. 
Many new attacks have been developed especially for the cloud. The Economic Denial of 
Sustainability (EDoS) attack is one in which the attacker targets the bill of the cloud 
solution adopter to cause economic loss. The ultimate objective of this research is to 
implement the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique and test its effectiveness to prevent 
EDoS attacks in clouds.  Through this research, a comprehensive taxonomy of EDoS 
attacks will also be proposed. The primary objectives of this research are: 
 Study the EDoS attacks and explore their effect on clouds. 
 Explore the existing mitigation techniques used to block EDoS attacks on clouds. 
 Propose a comprehensive taxonomy for the EDoS attacks. 
 Setup an experimental testbed for a cloud. 
 Implement the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique on the testbed. 
 Test the effectiveness of the EDoS-Shield in mitigating EDoS attacks. 
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1.2 Main Contribution 
The main contributions of this work are the following: 
 A taxonomy of attacks in cloud computing. 
 A comprehensive survey of the attacks that can result in EDoS attacks when 
applied to cloud computing. 
 A comprehensive taxonomy for the EDoS attacks. 
 Implementation of the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique and evaluation of its 
effectiveness. 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the work achieved 
in the literature to cover the security issues of the cloud computing. Next, we study the 
EDoS attack and provide a taxonomy of its different type in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the 
testbed setup and the steps followed to perform the experiments are discussed. The results 
of the experiments are presented and discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we modify the 
testbed to make it close to real-life. The same experiments are repeated using this testbed, 
and the results are discussed. Finally, the work presented in the thesis is concluded and 
the future work is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to the International Data Corporation (IDC), security is considered the greatest 
challenge of cloud computing [2]. Gartner, an information technology research and 
advisory company, listed a number of security risks of cloud computing that an 
organization should consider when moving to a cloud computing solution [23]. The 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) also published a report that lists their view of the top 
threads to cloud computing [24]. The security risks mentioned in both reports were taken 
seriously by many researchers.  
Che et al. [25] surveyed the well-known security models of the cloud computing, 
including the cloud multi-tenancy model of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), the cloud risk accumulation model of CSA, Jerico Formu’s cloud 
cube model, and the mapping model of cloud security and compliance.  They also studied 
the security strategies to protect the cloud from the perspectives of the customer, the 
service provider, and the government. 
Gruschka and Jensen [26] proposed a taxonomy for the attacks on the services of the 
cloud. In their taxonomy, they classified the attacks with respect to the notion of the 
surfaces of the attack of the participants of the cloud computing. They found that there 
can be six attack surfaces in cloud computing: service-to-user, user-to-service, cloud-to-
service, service-to-cloud, cloud-to-user, and user-to-cloud. They gave real-world 
examples to prove the efficiency of their classification.  
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Khorshed et al. [27] surveyed the literature for the concerns about the security of cloud 
computing. They investigated the most critical threats and their suggested solutions in the 
literature. They also discussed the different challenges in implementing solutions to those 
threats.  
Grobauer et al. [28] gave a definition for a cloud specific vulnerability. Based on the 
definition that they propose, they provided a survey about the cloud-specific 
vulnerabilities.  
Subashini and Kavitha [29] surveyed the security issues of the cloud computing based on 
the service delivery models. They reviewed the security issues in the Software as a 
Service (SaaS) model, the Platform as a Service (PaaS) model, and the Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) model. 
Jensen et al. [30] gave in depth explanation for the various technical security issues in 
cloud computing. They provided real-world examples about the security problems in the 
cloud. They also discussed the threats that can target the cloud, and discussed some of the 
possible countermeasures.  
Bhadauria and Sanyal [21] conducted a survey about the security threats in the different 
levels of the cloud architecture. They also discussed the security issues in the cloud 
deployment models. Further, they compared the strengths and limitations of several 
existing security schemes.  
Jangra and Bala [22] also surveyed the literature for the vulnerabilities, attacks, and 
security challenges in the cloud computing environment.  
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Vaquero et al. [8] analyzed the risks involved with multitenancy in cloud computing. 
They reviewed the literature for related risks and the proposed solutions to these risks. 
They also grouped the main attacks in relevant to the threats presented by [24]. 
In the literature, there are a small number of researches that focus on the EDoS attack and 
attempted to find a mitigation technique for it. 
In the next section, we present a taxonomy of the attacks in cloud computing. Then, we 
discuss the DDoS attack and its relationship with the EDoS attack. 
2.1 Taxonomy of Security Attacks in Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing security is one of the major challenges that prevent large business 
organizations from adopting the cloud solution for their businesses. In addition to the 
attacks that are specific to the cloud, almost all the attacks that apply to any regular 
network can be applicable to the cloud [7]. 
The attacks on the cloud can be classified based on service delivery models (SaaS, Paas, 
and IaaS), but many attacks can fall in more than one category. So, in addition to the 
classification of the cloud attacks using the service delivery models, we classify them 
based on the cloud hierarchy level targeted by the attack. In Figure ‎2.1, we classify the 
attacks that target the cloud security into three categories: virtualization level attacks, 
application level attacks, and network level attacks. Table 2.1 shows a classification for 
the most popular attacks based on the categories illustrated in Figure ‎2.1. Not all of these 
attacks are specific to cloud computing. Most of them are applicable to both regular 
computer networks and the cloud computing environment. 
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Figure 2.1: A Taxonomy for The Cloud Security Attacks 
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Table 2.1: Classification of Popular Security Attacks Based On the Cloud Attacks Taxonomy 
 Virtualization 
and 
Infrastructure 
Level Attacks 
Application Level Attacks 
Network Level 
Attacks Language and 
Malicious Injection 
Web Application 
Attacks 
IaaS 
Side channel attack. 
Timing channel 
attack. 
Cross-VMs attack*. 
Indirect Denial of 
Service attack. 
Covert Channel 
Attacks. 
 
- - 
Eavesdropping 
MITM Attack. 
Replay Attack. 
Impersonation 
Attack.* 
DNS Cache 
Poisoning Attack. 
Sniffer Attacks. 
Byzantine Failure.* 
BGP Prefix 
hijacking. 
IP Address Reuse 
Attack. 
PaaS Cross-VMs attack*. 
Blue Pill attack. 
Buffer Overflow 
Attack.* 
Backdoor and Debug 
Options.* 
- 
DDoS 
Sybil Attack. 
Impersonation 
Attack.* 
Byzantine Failure.* 
SaaS 
- 
Buffer Overflow 
Attack.* 
XML Signature 
Wrapping Attack. 
Trojan horse / 
Malware. 
Backdoor and Debug 
Options.* 
Hidden Field 
Manipulation Attack. 
Metadata Spoofing 
Attacks. 
SQL injection 
Attack. 
Cross-Site-Scripting 
(XSS): Stored or 
Reflected. 
Cookie Poisoning. 
CAPTCHA 
Breaking. 
DDoS 
URL Guessing 
Attack. 
Phishing Attack. 
- 
* : Attacks classified under more than one delivery model. 
2.1.1 Virtualization and Infrastructure Level Attacks 
In cloud computing, the security of the hypervisor, which is also called the virtual 
machine monitor (VMM), is very critical. A hacker who could compromise the 
hypervisor will have the privileges that would enable him to control all the virtual 
machines that reside on this hypervisor. In addition to compromising the hypervisor, an 
attacker can also use a malicious virtual machine to attack and compromise virtual 
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machines from this layer, i.e., hypervisor. Below are the well-known attacks that an 
attacker can use in this layer. 
1) Covert Channel Attacks: A covert channel attack refers to any attack that 
establishes a communication between two processes which are not supposed to 
communicate at all. An attacker may use covert channels to enable his virtual machine to 
communicate with a legitimate machine in unauthorized way [8]. 
2) Side Channel Attack: A side channel attack is defined as any attack that uses the 
information of the physical implementation of the security algorithm. In side channel 
attacks, the attacker monitors the behavior of the physical characteristics of the security 
system, such as the power consumption and the timing information [8]. An attacker may 
benefit from the fact that different parts of the secret key will have different CPU timing. 
Based on this timing information, the attacker might be able to reconstruct the secret key. 
The side channel attacks that use the timing information are usually referred to as “timing 
channel attacks”. 
3) Cross-VM Attacks: In cloud computing, virtual machines of different users may 
reside on the same physical host in order to maximize the utilization of the physical 
resources. The coexistence of virtual machines on the same physical host can allow an 
attacker who has access to one of these virtual machines to gain information from the 
other virtual machines. Ristenpart et al. [9] showed how this attack can be performed. 
4) Blue Pill Attack: Blue Pill attack is a rootkit that creates a thin hypervisor 
between the original hypervisor and the guest operating system. This hypervisor will 
intercept anything coming from the guest OS and will respond to these requests using 
10 
 
fake replies. Rutkowska [10], the designer of this rootkit, claims that the guest OS has no 
way to detect this rootkit. 
5) Indirect DoS Attacks: Jensen et al. [11] showed that the distributed denial of 
service attacks on a virtual machine in the cloud may result in indirect effect to the other 
untargeted virtual machines that reside on the same server. This is because large 
distributed denial of service attacks can consume much of the cloud resources. 
2.1.2 Application Level Attacks 
Unlike the virtualization and infrastructure level attacks, application level attacks target 
the applications used in cloud computing. Since the cloud services are accessed through 
the web, almost all the attacks that are used in regular web applications are applicable to 
cloud computing. Application level attacks can be further classified to language and 
malicious injection attacks, and web application attacks. Language and malicious 
injection attacks target the weaknesses in the programming languages and protocols. Web 
application attacks target the weaknesses of the web services. Application level attacks 
may either target the end user of the cloud services, or target the cloud solution adopter 
itself. A brief description is given below for buffer overflow, back door and debugs 
options, XML signature wrapping, and SQL injection attacks since they are quite popular 
attacks. The details of these attacks and the other attacks in this category can be found in 
[21] and [22]. 
1) Buffer Overflow Attack: in this attack, the attacker can cause the web application 
of the cloud adopter to execute arbitrary code by sending to it some crafted input. For 
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example, buffer overflow can be used to crash a program by putting it into an infinite 
loop, which will consume many resources [33].  
2) Backdoor and Debug Options: A backdoor is used to allow an attacker to access a 
VM without authentication. Debug options are used to re-test the program and can be 
used by an attacker to access the VM without authentication. 
3) XML Signature Wrapping: An attack in which the body of a SOAP message is 
moved to its header and a new malicious body is created. The attacker uses the new body 
to do malicious operations [11]. 
4) SQL Injection Attack: It is an attack in which harmful code is sent and executed 
in the database. The execution of this code can lead to serious problems like accessing 
sensitive information [21]. 
2.1.3 Network Level Attacks 
Like any remote service, cloud computing is accessed using a network. Networks are 
vulnerable to many different types of attacks that may result in disastrous problems to the 
cloud adopter and/or the end user of the cloud. Replay attack and DNS cache poisoning 
are chosen as examples of the attacks of the network level category. More information 
about these attacks and the other network level attacks can be found in [21] and [22].  
1) Replay Attack: An attack in which the attacker saves old messages sent to the 
victim and sends them again after a period of time [22]. These messages may include 
instructions that require much processing and hence require more computing resources. 
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2) DNS Cache Poisoning Attack: An attack in which DNS mapping is altered in a 
DNS server. This can harm the victim in different ways, including flooding it with large 
volumes of traffic that is intended to other servers. 
After discussing the categories of the different types of attacks that can target the cloud at 
any level of the infrastructure hierarchy, the next section discusses the DDoS attacks and 
their relationship to EDoS attacks. 
2.2 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is used to deny legitimate users of a service from using 
that service [12]. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is an attack that targets the 
availability of a system using multiple nodes controlled by the attack perpetrator [13]. A 
traditional DDoS attack is transformed to an EDoS attack when applied to the cloud [1, 6, 
14, 15, 16]. DDoS attacks are considered the most popular EDoS attacks in cloud 
computing since DDoS attacks intend to consume as much resources as possible. Because 
of this tight relationship between EDoS and DDoS attacks, we reviewed the literature to 
cover the different types of DDoS attacks. Figure ‎2.2 presents a comprehensive taxonomy 
of the DDoS attacks. It covers the classifications proposed by [13, 17, 18, 19, 20]. This 
section gives a brief discussion for the higher levels in this taxonomy. More information 
can be found in [13, 17, 18, 19, 20].  
1. Architecture 
The architecture of a DDoS attack defines the type of machines used in the attack, how 
they are controlled by the attack perpetrator, how they communicate the attack 
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commands, and how the actual attack is performed. Based on its architecture, the DDoS 
system can be classified into agent-handler, reflector, and IRC-based DDoS attack [18]. 
2. Degree of Automation 
The degree of automation describes how interactive the attack perpetrator should be in 
order to compromise machines and to send the attack commands to these machines. 
Based on the degree of automation, DDoS attacks can be manual, semi-automatic, or 
automatic. The semi-automatic and the automatic attacks can further be classified based 
on the host scanning strategy, propagation mechanism, and vulnerability scanning 
strategy [17]. 
3. Attack Dynamics 
Based on the attack dynamics, a DDoS attack can be continuous or variable. In 
continuous DDoS attacks, the attack rate is the same all the time. In variable DDoS 
attacks, the attack can start with a low rate, and then increase over time; or it can 
fluctuate from low to high and vice versa. The variable rate gives the attack more chances 
of not being discovered [17, 19]. 
4. Exploited Vulnerability 
The DDoS attacks on a specific target may cause bandwidth depletion or resource 
depletion. The bandwidth depletion DDoS attacks consume all the available bandwidth of 
a target machine making it inaccessible by legitimate users. The resource depletion DDoS 
attacks consume the resources of the target machine so that they will be unavailable for 
legitimate users [13, 18, 20]. 
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5. Persistence of Agent Set 
DDoS attacks can be classified based on the persistence of agent set into constant set and 
variable set. In constant set attack, all the agents execute the attack simultaneously. All 
the agents attack at the same time and stop at the same time. In variable set DDoS attack, 
groups of agents will be activated to start the attack at the same time while the other 
groups are off. After a period of time, the attacking agent groups will be deactivated and 
the other groups will start over [17]. 
6. Impact on the Victim 
Based on the impact on the victim, DDoS attacks can be classified into disruptive attacks 
and degrading attacks. Disruptive Attacks are those that cause the target machine to 
crash. Degrading Attacks consume resources of the target machine, making it unavailable 
to legitimate users or very slow in responding to them [17, 18, 19]. 
7. Source IP Address Validity 
It is necessary for the attacking machine to change its IP in the source field in order to 
prevent any trace back operations. DDoS attacks can be classified based on the source IP 
address validity into valid source IP address attacks and spoofed IP address attacks [17]. 
8. Victim Type 
Based on the type of the victim targeted by the attack, DDoS attacks can target an 
application, resource, host, infrastructure, or network.  
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9. Possibility of Characterization 
DDoS attacks can be either characterizable or non-characterizable. Characterizable DDoS 
attacks target a specific protocol or application, and can be recognized using the IP 
address and the transport header values. Non-characterizable attacks use combinations of 
different protocols in the attack packets to consume the bandwidth of the target [17, 18]. 
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Figure 2.2: Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks 
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3 CHAPTER 3 
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) 
Small organizations, i.e., cloud adopters, tend to rent storage and computing resources as 
a service from a cloud computing provider. The reason for this is to reduce investments. 
An organization will sign a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the cloud provider so 
that more resources will be allocated to this organization as needed. For some 
organizations, the upper boundary for the SLA is very high (very large portion of the 
resources of the cloud provider could be allocated to such an organization, if needed). An 
organization is billed based on its resource usage. An Economic Denial of Sustainability, 
or EDoS, attack is used by an attacker to cause economic loss to the cloud solution 
adopter. The resources of an EDoS attack’s victim will expand in order to handle the 
requests of the attack due to the elasticity property of the cloud. The cloud adopter, i.e., 
the victim, will have to pay for all the resources that have been utilized by the attack. 
EDoS attacks are only specific to cloud computing [14]. In this work, we assumed that 
any attack that targets the cloud adopter economically is considered an EDoS attack. 
However, DoS attacks and DDoS attacks are considered the most famous EDoS attacks 
when transformed from the conventional networks to the cloud computing environment 
[1, 6, 14, 15, 16]. These attacks are achieved by targeting the bandwidth of the victim’s 
network or by targeting the victim’s processing capacity. In conventional networks, these 
attacks aim to either exhaust the resources of the victim or crash them. In cloud 
computing, however, the elasticity property of the cloud will not allow the resources of 
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the targeted adopter to be exhausted by the attack. Instead, it will allocate more resources, 
resulting in an EDoS attack. To further complicate the scenario, HTTP based DDoS 
attacks are the most challenging attacks because it would be difficult to filter the 
legitimate traffic from the attack traffic. A cloud adopter must distinguish legitimate 
traffic from malicious traffic or it will end up blocking traffic that comes from legitimate 
users. In addition to the DDoS attack, there are several attacks that can result in EDoS. In 
the next section, we provide a survey for the attacks that can result in an EDoS attack.  
3.1 A Survey for EDoS Attacks  
In Tables 3.1-3.4, we listed all the attacks mentioned in Table 2.1 and checked them to 
determine if they can result in an EDoS attack.  
Table 3.1 shows the virtualization and infrastructure level attacks. The attacks that may 
result in an EDoS attack in this category include the covert channel, cross-VMs, and blue 
pill attacks.  
Table 3.2 lists the language and malicious injection attacks subcategory of the application 
level attacks category. The attacks of this category that may cause an EDoS attack are the 
buffer overflow, XML signature wrapping, Trojan horse, and backdoor and debug 
options. 
In Table 3.3, the web application attacks subcategory of the application level attacks 
category is presented. From this subcategory, the SQL injection attack is the only one that 
may result in an EDoS attack. 
19 
 
In Table 3.4, the attacks of the network level category are presented. Out of these, attacks 
that might cause EDoS are the MITM, replay attack, DNS cache poisoning, and BGP 
prefix hijacking. 
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Table 3.1: Virtualization and Infrastructure Level Attacks That May Result In EDoS 
Attack Attack Description EDoS? Reason for Decision 
Covert 
channel 
attack  
A prohibited communication 
between two processes which 
are not supposed to 
communicate [8].  
Yes 
If the attacker can perform this 
attack, then he will have the 
capability to send instructions to 
the victim’s VM. Depending on 
the type of these instructions, 
the attacker can instruct the 
victim’s VM to do operations 
that are resource extensive. 
Side 
channel 
and 
Timing 
channel 
attacks 
These attacks use the 
information of the physical 
implementation of the security 
algorithm to reconstruct the 
secret key [8]. 
No 
Many VMs use the same 
hardware of a single host server. 
The attacker should find a way 
to recognize when his victim is 
using the hardware. The attacker 
has also to recognize that 
information gained from the 
hardware is related to his 
victim, and it is not of another 
VM, which is difficult in the 
cloud computing environment.  
Cross-
VMs 
attack 
An attack in which the attacker 
is a VM that resides on the 
same cloud as the victim VM 
[9]. 
Yes 
If the attacker could 
communicate with the victim’s 
VM, then the attacker’s VM can 
instruct the victim’s VM to do 
operations that are resource 
extensive. 
Blue Pill 
attack 
An attack in which a thin 
rootkit hypervisor is 
implemented between the VMs 
and the hypervisor [10]. 
Yes 
A hacker can use this rootkit to 
control all the VMs that run on 
the rootkit. He can instruct a 
VM to perform some tasks and 
the legitimate cloud adopter that 
owns this VM will have to pay 
for this.  
Indirect 
DoS 
Indirect DoS attack is caused 
when a neighbor VM is under 
DDoS attack. When more 
resources are needed, they will 
not be available since they are 
allocated to the VM under 
DDoS attack [11]. 
No 
The victim VM of an indirect 
DoS attack will not consume 
any additional resources 
because they would be 
consumed by the VM that is 
under the DDoS attack. 
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Table 3.2: Application Level: Language and Malicious Injection Attacks That May Result in EDoS 
Attack Attack Description EDoS? Reason for Decision 
Buffer 
overflow 
attack 
The attacker can cause the 
web application of the cloud 
adopter to execute arbitrary 
code by sending it some 
crafted input. For example, it 
can be used to crash a 
program by making it run in 
an infinite loop which will 
consume many resources 
[33]. 
Yes 
If a code that results in buffer overflow 
has been successfully injected and 
executed in the victim’s VM (e.g., a 
program that is put in infinite loop), 
then this will result in consuming many 
resources. 
XML 
signature 
wrapping 
An attack in which the body 
of a SOAP message is 
moved to its header. The 
attacker uses the new body 
to do malicious operations 
[11]. 
Yes 
The new instructions sent by the 
attacker in the body of the new packet 
might cause economic loss to the cloud 
adopter if they include operations that 
will result in high resource allocation. 
Trojan 
horse 
A malicious program that 
hides itself as a legitimate 
file. 
Yes 
Depending on its type, a Trojan horse 
can be used just to interrupt the work 
of a VM by instructing it to execute 
resource extensive operations. To 
execute these operations, the VM will 
be allocated more resources resulting 
in an EDoS attack. 
Backdoor 
and debug 
options 
A backdoor is used to access 
a VM without 
authentication. Debug 
options are used to re-test 
the program and can be used 
by an attacker to access the 
VM without authentication. 
Yes 
When an attacker gets an access to the 
victim’s VM, the attacker can do 
anything, including performing 
resource extensive processing on 
behalf of the legitimate cloud adopter 
who will have to pay for performing 
this processing. 
Hidden 
field 
manipulati
on attack 
During a session, some of 
the data that are sent to the 
client are sent in hidden 
fields. This altered data will 
be displayed by the client 
instead of the original. 
No 
This attack is used to change the 
content of a web page to make it 
offensive, but it will not consume any 
resources and hence it will not result in 
an EDoS attack. 
Meta data 
spoofing 
A meta data file contains 
information about the 
mechanisms that will be 
followed during a session. It 
is sent before a session 
starts. 
Indirect 
This attack can be used as a first step 
to break the security of the VM. If 
succeeded, it will increase the chances 
of executing an EDoS attack. 
However, it is not an EDoS attack by 
itself. 
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Table 3.3: Application Level: Web Application Attacks That May Result in EDoS 
Attack Attack Description EDoS? Reason for Decision 
SQL 
injection 
attack 
It is an attack in which 
harmful code is sent 
and executed in the 
database [21]. 
Yes 
The injection might result in 
sophisticated processing (e.g., very 
complicated SQL statements) 
which requires more resources. 
Cross-Site-
Scripting 
(XSS) 
attack 
An attack in which 
malicious script is 
posted on a web page. 
The browser of a user 
exploring this page will 
execute the script and 
sensitive information 
can be stolen [34]. 
No 
This attack is used mainly to target 
the end-users of the services 
provided by the cloud adopter. 
Cookie 
poisoning 
Modifying a cookie to 
impersonate a 
legitimate user and get 
an unauthorized access 
[21]. 
Indirect 
If performed successfully, the 
attacker will get an unauthorized 
access by impersonating the cloud 
adopter. It is the first step to an 
EDoS attack, but not an EDoS 
attack by itself. 
CAPTCHA 
breaking 
Breaking the 
CAPTCHA will deny 
recognizing human 
from computers [21]. 
Indirect 
CAPTCHA is used as a 
countermeasure for DDoS attacks. 
If it is broken, DDoS attacks will 
result in EDoS attacks in the cloud. 
URL 
guessing 
Discovering the URL 
address of a VM. 
No 
Knowing the URL of the VM will 
give a chance to the attacker to 
cause problems such as knowing 
the suitable attack that can be used 
to bypass the security of the VM. It 
is not an EDoS attack. 
Phishing 
A method used to 
collect user passwords 
or financial data by 
fooling the user using 
forged e-mails with 
fake websites [35]. 
No 
This attack is applicable to the end-
user of the services of the cloud 
adopter. 
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Table 3.4: Network Level Attacks That May Result in EDoS 
Attack Attack Description EDoS? Reason for Decision 
Eavesdropping 
and Sniffer 
attacks. 
Listening to communications 
between a client and a cloud 
adopter, or between a cloud 
adopter and a cloud 
provider. 
Indirect 
Eavesdropping and Sniffer 
attacks will not cause EDoS 
attack by themselves, but 
they will increase the 
chances of the attacker. 
MITM 
The attacker creates two 
SSL/TLS connections, one 
with the client and the other 
with the server. It acts as a 
proxy between them [36]. 
Yes 
The attacker will 
impersonate the cloud 
adopter and will have the 
capability of instructing the 
VM belonging to the adopter 
to execute operations on 
behalf of the adopter which 
results in an EDoS attack. 
Replay attack 
An attack in which the 
attacker saves old messages 
sent to the victim and sends 
them again after a period of 
time [22]. 
Yes 
The attacker sends old 
messages that he saved 
previously. These messages 
might include instructions 
that require very powerful 
computing resources. 
Without proper security rules 
for handling old messages, 
the victim will execute the 
requests in these messages 
again and again which will 
result in economic loss.  
DNS cache 
poisoning 
An attack in which DNS 
mapping is altered in a DNS 
server. 
Yes 
Causes large volumes of 
traffic to be forwarded to the 
victim which will result in 
EDoS. 
BGP prefix 
hijacking 
Modifying the BGP 
advertisements so that traffic 
is routed to unintended 
destinations [21]. 
Yes 
This might cause large 
volumes of traffic to be 
routed to a targeted cloud 
adopter. This will result in an 
EDoS attack. 
IP address 
reuse attack 
The IP address reuse issue 
may result in forwarding 
traffic to unintended 
destinations. 
No 
From outside the cloud, the 
IP address of the cloud 
adopter is usually static. 
Since the IP address is not 
being changed frequently, the 
chances of being flooded 
because of the IP address 
reuse issue is limited. 
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This section was an introduction to the EDoS attack in which the idea of the attack was 
discussed and explained. The attacks presented in Table 2.1 were also studied to check if 
an attack among these can result in an EDoS attack. Tables 3.1-3.4 show these attacks 
and state whether an attack can result in an EDoS attack or not. A brief description for 
each attack and the reason for considering it leading to an EDoS attack or not are also 
presented in the Tables 3.1-3.4. In the next section, we provide a taxonomy for the EDoS 
attacks based on the way an attack, from Tables 3.1-3.4, can result in an EDoS attack, 
which will affect the adopter economically. 
3.2 Taxonomy of EDoS Attacks  
From Tables 2.1and 3.1-3.4, the EDoS attacks can be classified based on the cloud 
service delivery models and the cloud attacks taxonomy presented in Figure ‎2.1. 
However, we decided to provide a taxonomy for EDoS attacks based on the way an 
attack, from Tables 3.1-3.4, can result in an EDoS attack in cloud computing. The reason 
of classifying EDoS attacks in this way is to categorize EDoS attacks in a limited number 
of categories so that a single mitigation technique for an attack category can possibly be 
used to countermeasure other EDoS attacks that fall under that category. Following this 
way of classification, the EDoS attacks can be classified into 5 categories: Resource 
Extensive Requests Attacks, Malicious Code Attacks, Impersonation Attacks, Prohibited 
Access Attacks, and Flooding Attacks. Figure ‎3.1 shows the proposed taxonomy for the 
EDoS attacks based on the way an attack impacts or affects the cloud to cause 
economical loss to its adopter. 
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Figure 3.1: Taxonomy for EDoS Attacks 
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1. Resource Extensive Requests Attacks 
In a resource extensive requests attack, the attacker sends requests to the victim’s VM 
that result in resource extensive operations which will force the victim to request more 
resources. The type of requests is different for different applications. For example, if an 
image processing application is hosted in the cloud, then the attacker can request very 
complicated operations on many large images. These operations require much more 
computing resources in order to be executed. As a result, additional computing resources 
will be allocated to respond to these complicated operations and the cloud solution 
adopter will have to pay for them at the end. The attacker might send these requests 
intentionally to cause economic loss to the cloud adopter. 
Attacks under this category can further be classified into two subcategories: recognizable 
and non-recognizable. In recognizable attacks, the attack requests can be recognized 
because they are violating the security rules which prohibit communication between these 
two VMs. For example, if the attacker’s VM tries to send a request to a VM that resides 
on the same physical host as the attacker’s VM, then this would be detected because it is 
not allowed. The attacker has to find a way to break this rule before sending any requests. 
Attacks that are of this type are the covert channel attack and cross-VMs attack. 
In non-recognizable attacks, the attacker sends requests that seem legitimate to the 
system. However, these requests are spoofed and are intended to cause economic loss to 
the cloud adopter. From Tables 3.1-3.4, the EDoS attacks that are of this type are XML 
signature wrapping attack, SQL injection attack, and replay attack. 
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2. Malicious Code Attacks 
In malicious code attacks, a malicious code is executed in the victim’s VM that results in 
high consumption of computing resources. Malicious code attacks are achieved by 
inserting instructions of malicious code as a complete malicious program or in a 
malicious way to a legitimate program that runs in the VM. When executing this code, it 
will consume many resources like in the case of making a program run in an infinite loop. 
The difference between this category and the resource extensive requests attacks is that in 
the case of malicious code attacks, programming instructions are executed inside a 
legitimate program (as in the case of buffer overflow), or as a malicious program (as in 
the case of Trojan horse). In resource extensive requests attacks, resources are allocated 
to respond to spoofed requests that ask executing a job that requires many resources. 
Malicious code attacks have two subcategories: slipped code and malicious program 
attacks. In slipped code attacks, instructions are inserted in a malicious way to a program 
that is running in the victim’s VM. These instructions might be used to execute resource 
extensive operations. From Tables 3.1-3.4, the attack that falls under this category is the 
buffer overflow attack. In malicious program attacks, a complete malicious program is 
inserted and executed somehow in the victim’s VM. Trojan horse is an example of the 
attacks that fall under this category. 
3. Impersonation attacks 
A legitimate cloud adopter is charged for executing his jobs in the cloud. If the identity of 
the cloud adopter is spoofed somehow by an attacker, the attacker will use the resources 
of the legitimate adopter on behalf of this adopter. The legitimate adopter will have to 
28 
 
pay for executing the jobs for that attacker. Attacks that are of this type are considered as 
impersonation attacks. From Tables 3.1-3.4, the EDoS attacks that come as a result of an 
impersonation attack are the blue pill attack and the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. 
4. Prohibited Access Attacks 
In prohibited access category attacks, the attacker accesses and controls the VM of the 
victim in a prohibited way. After accessing it, the attacker can use the VM for his own 
purposes. The attacker has full control on the attacked VM in this category and the 
legitimate adopter will have to pay for executing the jobs of the attacker. The attacks that 
are of this type from Tables 3.1-3.4 are the backdoor and debug options. 
5. Flooding Attacks 
Flooding attacks are the most common type of EDoS attacks in which large volumes of 
traffic are sent to the victim’s VM which results in requesting more computing resources 
to respond to. Flooding attacks can be classified further into two subcategories: direct 
flooding and indirect flooding attacks. In direct flooding attacks, the attacker directly 
floods the VM of the victim using any DDoS technique from those explained in the 
previous section. This subcategory includes all the DDoS attacks. In indirect flooding 
attacks, the attacker will not send traffic directly to the victim. Instead, he will perform a 
malicious action that will result in rerouting large volumes of traffic to the VM of the 
victim. From Tables 3.1-3.4, the attacks that fall under this subcategory are the DNS 
cache poisoning and the BGP prefix hijacking. 
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3.3 Existing Mitigation Techniques  
In the literature, researchers that attempted to address the EDoS attack are very few. 
Some mitigation techniques have been developed to block EDoS attacks. This indicates 
that more research is required to protect the cloud computing from EDoS attacks.   
As a mitigation technique for EDoS, sPoW is used and it requires a proof of work from 
the clients before completing the interaction with the server [31]. However, sPoW has a 
number of disadvantages discussed by Sqalli et al. [15].  
VivinSandar and Shenai [14] showed how a DDoS attack is transformed to an EDoS 
attack in the cloud. They also surveyed the literature for mitigation techniques against 
EDoS and DDoS attacks in the cloud. Finally, they proposed a security framework for 
EDoS attack protection. However, Modi et al. [32] pointed that this mitigation technique 
is inefficient because it is based on the traditional firewall only. 
Kumar et al. [37] proposed a mitigation technique for the EDoS attack using in-cloud 
scrubber service. Their solution is provided as a service by the cloud service provider. 
The solution uses two modes of operation, normal mode and suspected mode. When the 
web server is working as expected, then the system will work in the normal mode. But 
when the service provider notices that the traffic that targets the web server exceeds an 
acceptable threshold, then the operation will be switched to the suspected mode. In the 
suspected mode, the requests will be sent to a scrubber server which will send puzzles to 
the clients to distinguish legitimate requests from bot requests. Their proposed solution 
also attempts to detect low-rate DDoS attacks. 
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Sqalli et al. [15] proposed a solution called the EDoS-Shield to mitigate the EDoS attack. 
The EDoS-Shield classifies the requests to whitelisted and blacklisted based on the 
source of the request, legitimate or bot. This is achieved using a verifier node which 
creates the whitelist and blacklist. A virtual firewall is used to block all the requests that 
come from the blacklisted sources. This work was expanded by Al-Haidari et al. [16] to 
mitigate the attack in case the attacker uses spoofed IP addresses. The following section 
is allocated to explain the EDoS-Shield in more details as it is the main topic of this 
work. 
3.4 The EDoS-Shield Mitigation Technique  
Figure ‎3.2 shows the architecture of the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique. The main 
components of the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique are the virtual firewall (VF) and the 
verifier node (V-Node). The virtual firewall has two lists of IP addresses, whitelist and 
blacklist. The whitelist consists of those source IP addresses which are considered 
legitimate. All the requests that come from those sources are allowed to pass the firewall 
to the cloud adopter servers. On the other hand, all the IP addresses that are contained in 
the blacklist are considered malicious, and hence all the traffic that comes from these IPs 
is blocked by the firewall.  
When there is a request from an unknown source, i.e., its IP is not included in the 
firewall’s lists, the request is forwarded to the V-Node. The V-Node sends a graphical 
Turing test to the source of this request. If the request has been issued by a human, the 
human will be able to pass the test, i.e., respond to the test. Then, the V-Node will add the 
IP address of the source of the request to the whitelist of the firewall. Any following 
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requests from this source will be allowed to pass the firewall. However, if the request has 
been generated by a machine, e.g., bot, the machine will fail to solve the test. In this case, 
the V-Node will add the IP address of the source of the request to the blacklist of the 
firewall. Any following requests from this source will be blocked by the firewall. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique is 
capable of blocking the direct flooding type of EDoS attacks presented in the taxonomy 
of Figure ‎3.1. The EDoS-Shield might not be suitable to mitigate indirect flooding 
attacks. The reason for this is the fact that the attack perpetrator may intend to make the 
attack packets be forwarded to the cloud using devices or servers that are supposed to be 
legitimate. If the IP addresses of these servers or devices are listed in the whitelist of the 
firewall of the EDoS-Shield, then all the traffic forwarded from these devices will be 
accepted, which will result in an EDoS attack. Hence, the EDoS-Shield in its basic form 
is only capable of blocking the direct flooding type of EDoS attacks presented in the 
taxonomy. 
In this work, the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique has been implemented using an 
experimental testbed. Chapter 4 discusses the testbed setup and the steps followed to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the EDoS-Shield in mitigating the EDoS attacks. Then, in 
Chapter 5, the results collected from the testbed are presented, discussed, and compared 
with those reported in Sqalli et al. [15]. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
TESTBED SETUP 
In this chapter, we will discuss the testbed setup and how the experiments are performed. 
4.1 Testbed Architecture 
This section discusses how the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique has been implemented 
and evaluated using an experimental testbed in the lab. Since the main objective of this 
work is to compare the results obtained from the experimental testbed to those obtained 
from the simulation in [15], we prepared the testbed to be very close to the assumptions 
made in the simulation. First, the testbed has been designed without implementing the 
mitigation technique in order to study the effect of the EDoS attack on the cloud before 
adding the mitigation technique. Figure ‎4.1 shows the testbed before implementing the 
EDoS-Shield mitigation technique. Next, the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique was 
implemented in the testbed, and its effectiveness in blocking the EDoS attack was 
evaluated. Figure ‎4.2 shows the testbed after implementing the EDoS-Shield mitigation 
technique. The results obtained from the testbed are compared to those obtained from the 
simulation in Chapter 5 for both cases. The main components of the testbed for each case 
will be discussed next. 
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Figure 4.1: The Testbed without the EDoS-Shield Mitigation Technique 
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Figure 4.2: The Testbed with the EDoS-Shield Mitigation Technique Implemented 
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4.1.1 Components of the Testbed before Adding the EDoS-Shield 
To study the effect of the EDoS attack on the cloud, a testbed was prepared without 
implementing the EDoS-Shield, like in Figure ‎4.1. The main component of this testbed 
will be discussed in this section. 
Cloud Services 
The main component of our testbed is the cloud. Citrix’s CloudPlatform [38] and 
XenServer [39] were used to deploy the cloud. The CloudPlatform is a cloud 
management software which is responsible for managing the cloud and its resources. A 
single physical server was used as a management node on which the CloudPlatform was 
installed. Three physical servers were used as compute nodes on which the hypervisor, 
i.e., XenServer, was installed. The virtual machines (VMs), or the instances, on which the 
services provided by the cloud are deployed, run on these compute nodes. All the VMs 
are identical small instances that were created from a single template. This template 
contains a simple web server configured on CentOS Linux operating system [40]. Apache 
Server was used as the web server [41]. More details about the template configuration 
will be provided in the following sections. 
Load Balancer 
The load balancer is used to load the traffic among the VMs of the cloud. Our testbed 
uses Citrix’s NetScaler VPX (200) [42] as a load balancer. NetScaler VPX is a virtual 
appliance that is installed on XenServer, on a separate physical server. NetScaler is 
configured and managed through the CloudPlatform. It is the entry point to the cloud 
services and hence all the traffic that comes to the cloud, or goes out of the cloud, passes 
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through it. The dashboard of NetScaler is used for monitoring during performing the 
experiments as will be indicated later. 
Traffic Generator 
The traffic generator is used to simulate legitimate and malicious HTTP requests during 
experiments. We used Apache JMeter as the HTTP traffic generator [43]. In addition to 
the basic features that come with JMeter by default, we added the standard set of plugins 
[44], so that we can add more features to JMeter. We installed JMeter on 8 VMs running 
on XenServer, which is installed on a separate physical server. Then, we performed a set 
of experiments to generate traffic for different numbers of VMs. We found that changing 
the number of attacking VMs, while generating the attack traffic at the same rate each 
time, will not affect the results of the experiments. In our experiments, we used 8 
attacking VMs to simulate 8 users.  
Three JMeter plugins were used to generate and control the traffic in addition to 
monitoring it. These plugins are the ultimate thread group, the throughput shaping timer, 
and the hits per second listener. We also used the HTTP request sampler to format the 
HTTP requests. Below is a brief description of each one of these components and how it 
has been used in the experiments. 
The ultimate thread group plugin is used to create the threads that simulate real users. The 
maximum HTTP request rate that a JMeter VM sends in our experiments is 1000 
Request/Second. To achieve this rate, the ultimate thread group was configured to create 
1100 threads. The additional 100 threads are used to guarantee that the HTTP requests 
are always more than the HTTP requests rate that is targeted. This in turn will guarantee 
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that the targeted HTTP requests rate is always achieved. The ultimate thread group was 
configured to create the threads within 30 seconds.  
Since the traffic created by the 1100 threads is always more than the targeted HTTP 
requests rate, the throughput shaping timer is used to specify and send the exact rate that 
is targeted in an experiment. The targeted rate is achieved in two steps. First, the 
throughput shaping timer starts with 1 Req/Sec rate and keeps increasing the rate until the 
targeted rate is achieved. The throughput shaping timer was configured to complete this 
step in 30 seconds. After achieving the targeted rate, the throughput shaping timer will 
keep sending HTTP requests at that rate as a fixed rate in the second step. The throughput 
shaping timer is configured to keep using the targeted rate for 3600 seconds.  These 
requests are sent to the IP address specified in the HTTP request sampler, which is used 
in the experiments only to specify the destination IP address to which the traffic will be 
forwarded. 
To make sure that the JMeter VM sends HTTP requests at the targeted rate, the hits per 
second listener plugin is used. Figure 4.3 shows a snapshot of this plugin. The targeted 
rate in the figure is 400 Req/sec. The figure shows that the throughput shaping timer 
keeps increasing the rate in the first 30 seconds. Then, it keeps sending the traffic at a 
fixed rate. 
Finally, to make sure that the aggregated traffic created from all the JMeter VMs is at the 
targeted rate of an experiment, the dashboard of NetScaler is used. Figure 4.4 shows a 
snapshot for the NetScaler dashboard. The targeted rate in the figure is 1200 Req/Sec. 
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Figure 4.3: A Snapshot of the Hits Per Second Plugin of JMeter 
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Figure 4.4: A Snapshot for the Dashboard of NetScaler 
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4.1.2 Components of the Testbed after Adding the EDoS-Shield 
In addition to the components discussed in the previous section, the firewall and the 
verifier node were added to the testbed to build the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique. 
Firewall 
The firewall is used to filter all the traffic that comes to the cloud. The traffic that comes 
from the whitelisted sources is allowed to access the cloud services, while the traffic that 
comes from blacklisted sources is dropped. To achieve this, we used Linux’s iptables 
firewall [45]. The iptables firewall on a CentOS Linux was configured to forward the 
traffic from unknown sources, i.e., traffic which the IP address of its source is not listed 
in the firewall lists, to the V-Node. The iptables forwards the traffic of a whitelisted 
source to the load balancer, and it drops the traffic that comes from a blacklisted source. 
The lists of the firewall are updated by the verifier node. 
Verifier Node (V-Node) 
The verifier node (V-Node) is responsible for updating the whitelist and blacklist on the 
firewall. It is a web server that sends Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell 
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) to the clients and updates the lists of the 
firewall based on the response of the client. We implemented the V-Node using the 
WampServer [46] installed on a Windows VM running on a separate physical server. The 
CAPTCHA was implemented using the code in [47]. 
Figure 4.5 shows the physical network topology of the testbed. Two VLANs were used to 
separate the traffic of the experiments from the other traffic in the lab. The firewall, 
verifier node, VMs running on the XenServer servers, and the JMeter server are all on a 
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separate VLAN. This allows the experiments to be executed using a single physical 
switch without the need of a router. All the other devices, including the physical 
XenServer Servers, are connected to another VLAN. The Network Attached Storage 
(NAS) is used by the CloudPlatform to store the data of the VMs. This configuration 
enables the live migration of VMs from one XenServer host to another automatically 
when needed. The JMeter server is connected to the network using 2 Gigabit network 
interface cards. From the JMeter VMs, 4 are connected to the network using one of these 
network cards. The other 4 VMs are connected using the other network card. 
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Figure 4.5: The Physical Network Topology of the Testbed 
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4.2 Experiments Execution Steps 
This section describes the steps followed to perform the experiments. In the following 
subsection we provide the details of performing the experiments to study the effect of the 
EDoS attack on the cloud before using the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique. After that, 
we discuss the experiments executions steps to evaluate the effectiveness of the EDoS-
Shield in blocking the EDoS attack. 
4.2.1 Studying the Effect of EDoS Attack on Cloud Computing 
In order to study the effect of the EDoS attack on cloud computing, we performed a set of 
experiments without using the EDoS-Shield. The results of these experiments are used to 
study the effect of the EDoS attacks in terms of CPU utilization and the response time. 
These results are also compared to the simulation results obtained in [15]. Figure ‎4.1 
illustrates the testbed architecture used in these experiments. In these experiments, the 
traffic generator component sends the traffic directly to the load balancer. The load 
balancer sends the traffic to the instances (VMs) of the cloud on which a simple web page 
is hosted. This web page was designed to make the web application on an instance to 
cause the same CPU utilization like that of the simulation. Hence, the web servers on the 
cloud instances have the following properties: 
1- Each instance has the capability to handle 100 HTTP Request/Second (Req/Sec). 
2- The packet size of the response is 580 bytes. 
Then, following the same assumptions of the simulation, we assumed the upper threshold 
that will trigger autoscaling is 80% CPU utilization. This means that a new instance 
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should be created and assigned to the load balancer if the total CPU utilization for all the 
instances exceeds 80%. 
The maximum attack rate that has been used in the simulation is 8000 Req/Sec, and the 
maximum number of instances is 106. We executed half of the experiments of the 
simulation because of the limited resources in the testbed. Hence, the maximum attack 
rate that we used in the experiments is 4000 Req/Sec, and the maximum number of 
instances that we used is 56.Before starting an experiment, we make sure that all the 
cloud instances that will be used in the experiment are connected to the load balancer 
from the dashboard of NetScaler. The number of the instances that are used in an 
experiment depends on the rate of the attack in that experiment. To ensure that the 
incoming traffic to the cloud will not use more than 80% of the processing resources, we 
increase the number of instances following the same approach used in simulation. Hence 
the number of the required instances will be calculated as follows: 
8.0


S
. Thus,  1/25.1  S  (4.1) 
Where S is the required number of instances,  is the traffic arrival rate, and  is the 
service rate.  
In addition to the EDoS attack rate, there is a 400 Req/Sec fixed rate of the legitimate 
traffic. This rate is added to the EDoS attack rate in all the experiments. 
Figure ‎4.6Figure ‎4.6 shows the number of required instances for each experiment based 
on equation 4.1. The service rate of each instance is 100 Req/Sec as discussed previously. 
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Figure 4.6: Number of Required Instances before Using the EDoS-Shield 
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After making sure that the appropriate number of instances has been assigned to the load 
balancer, we start the experiment by running the traffic generation on JMeter. We make 
sure that the HTTP requests are sent in the targeted rate using the hits per second plugin 
of JMeter and through the dashboard of NetScaler, as discussed earlier.  
We keep monitoring the CPU utilization through Citrix’s XenCenter [46], which is 
installed on a laptop to collect the results. When the CPU utilization of the instances 
reaches the steady state, the CPU utilization of each instance is collected separately, and 
then the average CPU utilization is calculated. The response time is measured using an 
add-on installed on the Firefox web browser called Firebug [47]. For each experiment, 
the response time is collected 30 times, and then the average is calculated.  
For each rate of the EDoS attack, experiment is repeated 10 times. Each time the CPU 
utilization and the response time are collected. After collecting the results for all the 10 
repetitions, the average CPU utilization and the average response time are calculated. 
This section explained the steps followed when performing the experiments of studying 
the effect of the EDoS attack on cloud computing. The next section discusses the steps 
followed when performing the experiments of evaluating the EDoS-Shield mitigation 
technique. 
4.2.2 Evaluating the EDoS-Shield Mitigation Technique 
In this section, the experiments performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the EDoS-
Shield in mitigating the EDoS attack are discussed. Most of the steps are the same as 
described in the previous section. The new change in these experiments is the 
introduction of the firewall and the V-Node, which are the components of the EDoS-
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Shield. Figure ‎4.2 shows the architecture of the testbed after implementing the EDoS-
Shield. 
In this set of experiments, the firewall is the entry point to the cloud instead of the load 
balancer. All the traffic that comes to the cloud, or goes out of the cloud passes the 
firewall. JMeter on the 8 traffic generator VMs is configured to send the traffic to the 
firewall. We assumed the following for the traffic generator VMs when performing the 
experiments: 
1- From the 8 traffic generator VMs, 2 will simulate the legitimate traffic, while the 
other 6 VMs will simulate the malicious traffic. 
2- The CAPTCHA will be entered correctly for the legitimate traffic, and incorrectly 
for the malicious traffic. There is no timeout or false positives. 
3- The first request from a VM will be sent using its web browser. The CAPTCHA 
will be answered correctly for the legitimate VMs, and incorrectly for the 
malicious VMs. 
In all the experiments, the dashboard of NetScaler shows that only the legitimate traffic 
arrives to the cloud. Since the legitimate traffic is only 400 Req/Sec, then the number of 
cloud instances that are used in all the experiments is 6, as the equation 4.1 indicates. 
This is illustrated in Figure ‎4.7. 
The experiment for each of the EDoS rates is repeated 10 times. The results are collected 
and calculated the same way as explained in the previous section. 
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Figure 4.7: Number of Required Instances When Using the EDoS-Shield 
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This chapter discussed the testbed setup and the steps followed when performing the 
experiments using the experimental testbed. In Chapter 5, the results of the experiments 
will be presented and discussed. 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In Chapter 4, the steps of performing the experiments were explained. In this chapter, the 
results of the experiments are presented and discussed. In section 5.1, the results of the 
experiments that study the effect of the EDoS attack on cloud computing are discussed. 
The results of the experiments studying the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique are 
presented and discussed in section 5.2. 
5.1 Studying the Effect of EDoS Attack on Cloud Computing  
The first set of experiments was performed to study the impact of the EDoS attack on 
cloud computing before using the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique. The steps followed 
when performing these experiments were discussed in section 4.2.1. The results obtained 
from these experiments are discussed in this section. 
Each of the experiment has been repeated 10 times. Figure 5.1 shows the standard 
deviation for the CPU utilization results collected from each experiment. Figure 5.1 
shows that the standard deviation for the CPU utilization results is very small. This 
indicates that there are no major differences in the results collected for each experiment.  
Figure 5.2 compares the average CPU utilization results of the testbed to those of the 
simulation. The CPU utilization results of the testbed are very close to the results of the 
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simulation. Both results show that when the rate the EDoS attack increases, the CPU 
utilization increases. But the CPU utilization will not exceed the threshold of 80% since 
more instances will be added to the cloud as the attack rate increases. Both results show 
that when the rate the EDoS attack increases, the CPU utilization increases. More 
instances will be added to the cloud as the attack rate increases. The addition of the new 
instances for handling the attack requests will result in a severe economic loss for the 
cloud adopter. 
Figure 5.3 shows the relative error percentage for the CPU utilization comparison of 
Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2 illustrates that the results obtained from the testbed are very close 
to the results obtained from the simulation in terms of CPU utilization. The difference 
between the results of the testbed and the simulation is always below 5%. 
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Figure 5.1: Standard Deviation for the CPU Utilization Results 
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Figure 5.2: CPU Utilization Comparison before Using the EDoS-Shield 
55 
 
 
  
Figure 5.3: Relative Error Percentage for the CPU Utilization Comparison before Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 5.4 shows the standard deviation for the response time results before using the 
EDoS-Shield. The standard deviation in Figure 5.4 illustrates that the results collected for 
the response time for each experiment are close to each other. 
Figure 5.5 shows a comparison between the results obtained for the response time in both 
the testbed and simulation. Figure 5.5 shows that the response time results from the 
testbed are close to those of the simulation. The results for both the testbed and 
simulation in Figure 5.5 clearly show the effect of the EDoS attack on cloud computing 
in terms of response time. Figure 5.5 shows that when the rate of the EDoS attack 
increases, the response time will be greatly affected too. In addition to the delay that the 
users of the service provided by the cloud adopter will experience, more instances will be 
allocated to the cloud adopter if the autoscaling policy is based on the response time. 
Figure 5.6 shows the relative error percentage for the response time comparison reported 
in Figure 5.5. Although the figure shows that the difference between the results of some 
of the experiments is around 16%, the maximum difference between the response time 
results of the testbed and the simulation is around 5 milliseconds. 
In the next section, the results obtained after implementing the EDoS-Shield mitigation 
technique are discussed.  
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Figure 5.4: Standard Deviation for the Response Time Results Before Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 5.5: Response Time Comparison Before Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 5.6: Relative Error Percentage for the Response Time Comparison Before Using the EDoS-Shield 
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5.2 Studying the EDoS-Shield Mitigation Technique  
After studying the effect of the EDoS attack on cloud computing, the results of adding the 
EDoS-Shield mitigation technique will be discussed in this section. 
After implementing and using the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique on the testbed, the 
dashboard of NetScaler showed that only the traffic of the legitimate traffic generator 
VMs is allowed to arrive to the cloud instances. The HTTP requests rate on the dashboard 
of NetScaler is always 400 Req/Sec, which is the rate of the legitimate traffic. All the 
traffic that comes from the attacking VMs that are blacklisted is dropped by the firewall. 
For this reason, the CPU utilization for both the testbed and simulation is almost fixed 
during all the experiments, as shown in Figure 5.7. Both the results of the testbed and the 
simulation in Figure 5.7 show that the EDoS-Shield is capable of eliminating the effect of 
the EDoS attack on the CPU utilization. 
The relative error percentage for the CPU utilization comparison when using the EDoS-
Shield is calculated and presented in Figure 5.8. As shown in the figure, the relative error 
percentage is always below 1%. 
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Figure 5.7: CPU Utilization Comparison After Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 5.8: Relative Error Percentage for the CPU Utilization Comparison After Using the EDoS-Shield 
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The standard deviation for the response time results in Figure 5.9 illustrates that the 
response time results collected are close to each other. The figure shows no much 
difference in the collected results for the response time of each experiment. 
Figure 5.10 shows a comparison between the values of the response time for both the 
testbed and simulation when using the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique.  This shows 
that there is a small difference between the response time results of the testbed and the 
simulation when the EDoS-Shield is used. The slight increase in the values of response 
time as the EDoS attack rate increases, which is clear in the results of the testbed, is due 
to the packet processing time at the firewall.  Figure 5.10 shows that the EDoS-Shield has 
significantly decreased the effect of the EDoS attack on the response time. 
Figure 5.11 shows the relative error percentage for the response time comparison 
between the testbed and the simulation when the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique is 
used. The maximum difference is around 5 milliseconds in the first experiment. 
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Figure 5.9: Standard Deviation for the Response Time Results After Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 5.10: Response Time Comparison after Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 5.11: Relative Error Percentage for the Response Time Comparison after Using the EDoS-Shield 
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5.3 Challenges and Limitations 
Below are some challenges and limitations of this work: 
 Executing the experiments and collecting the results are performed manually. For 
instance, the attack is launched from JMeter instances manually, the CPU utilization 
results are collected manually via XenCenter, and the response time results are 
collected manually via Firebug. This process takes much time.  
 XenCenter gives the CPU utilization results in integer numbers. The results of the 
simulation are given in real numbers, which makes them more precise.  The current 
results of the testbed are not severely affected by this; however, we will be able to 
obtain more accurate values if another way is used to collect the results of the CPU 
utilization in real numbers, as in the case of simulation. 
 The number of physical servers used in the testbed is limited. If more servers could be 
added to the testbed, then more experiments can be executed.  
 In the current testbed, the malicious user is assumed to enter the CAPTCHA 
incorrectly in order to be added to the blacklist of the firewall. In real life scenario, 
the malicious user will not respond to CAPTCHA at all.  
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6 CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENTS IN A REAL-LIFE ENVIRONMENT 
The previous two chapters were dedicated to the validation of the simulation results. In 
this chapter, we study the effect of the EDoS attack in an environment that is very close 
to real-life. We also study the effect of using the EDoS-Shield in such environment. The 
major changes in the testbed are explained in the next section. The following two sections 
present and discuss the results of the experiments. 
6.1 Testbed Setup Changes 
The testbed setup used for these experiments is the same as that used to validate the 
simulation results. The only difference is the replacement of the template. The new 
template has a real website that has an index page with text and many pictures [50]. The 
index page has 24 elements that are downloaded to the browser of the client, with a total 
size of 507.4 KB. We added an additional picture to the index page to achieve this size 
and make it close to the size of that of modern websites like Yahoo. Figure ‎6.1 shows a 
snapshot of the index page. 
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Figure 6.1: A Snapshot of the Index Page of the New Website Template 
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We used the small size service offering for the VMs hosting this website. We found that 
it is better to set to 40% the upper CPU utilization threshold that indicates the need of 
creating additional instances. The reason behind this decision is the fact that we found 
that the 40% CPU utilization is achieved by sending around 1600 HTTP requests per 
second. This means that a rate of 3200 Req/Sec is needed to achieve the 80% CPU 
utilization. However, we found that NetScaler will not allow more than approximately 
2100 HTTP Req/Sec to pass through it in these experiments. At rates higher than this, the 
throughput will exceed the limit permitted by the current license of NetScaler, i.e., 200 
Mbps. This is due to the size of the new website which is 507.4 KB as opposed to 580 
Bytes used in the previous experiments. 
Since the maximum HTTP requests rate that can be used is these experiments is around 
2100 Rec/Sec, we performed the experiments using the EDoS attack rates of 0, 400, 800, 
1200, and 1600. In addition, 400 Req/Sec rate is used as legitimate traffic. Hence, the 
maximum traffic rate that is used in the experiments is 2000 Req/Sec. The maximum 
number of instances used in the experiments before using the EDoS-Shield is 2, while the 
number of instances is always equal to 1 when using the EDoS-Shield. This is shown in 
Figure ‎6.2 and Figure ‎6.3 respectively. 
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Figure 6.2: Number of Instances Used before Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 6.3: Number of Instances Used after Using the EDoS-Shield 
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6.2 The Effect of the EDoS Attack on the Cloud 
Figure ‎6.4 shows the CPU utilization before using the EDoS-Shield. It is clear that the 
CPU utilization increases in the first three experiments as the attack rate increases. Then, 
it gets low again at the attack rate of 1200 Req/Sec. At this attack rate, the total traffic 
rate is 1600, when adding the legitimate traffic. This will results in around 40% CPU 
utilization. As a result, a new instance is created, and the CPU utilization will decrease by 
nearly a half, as shown in Figure ‎6.4. The CPU utilization increases again when 
increasing the EDoS attack rate to 1600 Req/Sec. This behavior is the same as that of the 
results reported in Chapter 5 in illustrating that more computing resources will be 
allocated to the cloud as the EDoS attack rate increases. This is because the CPU 
utilization increases as the EDoS attack rate increases. 
Figure ‎6.5 shows the response time results before using the EDoS-Shield. As shown in 
the figure, the EDoS attack has a severe effect on the response time if no mitigation 
technique is used. This behavior is the same as discussed previously in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 6.4: CPU Utilization before Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 6.5: The Response Time before Using the EDoS-Shield 
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6.3 The Effect of Using the EDoS-Shield 
Figure ‎6.6 presents the results of the CPU utilization after using the EDoS-Shield. The 
CPU utilization is almost fixed, and the number of instances is always 1. The dashboard 
of NetScaler shows that only the legitimate traffic can access the cloud services. This 
behavior is the same as that reported in Figure ‎5.7. 
In Figure ‎6.7, the results of the response time after using the EDoS-Shield are presented. 
The response time increases slightly as the attack rate increases because of the packet 
processing at the firewall. However, this increase is significantly below the results of the 
response time of Figure ‎6.5, when no mitigation technique is used at all. This is clearly 
illustrated in Figure ‎6.8, which shows the comparison between the results of the response 
time before and after using the EDoS-Shield.   
The results of this chapter confirm the results of Chapter 4 in illustrating the severe effect 
of the EDoS attack on the CPU utilization and the response time. The results of both 
chapters also confirm that the use of the EDoS-Shield can significantly minimize the 
effect of the EDoS attack on cloud computing.  
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Figure 6.6: CPU Utilization after Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 6.7: Response Time after Using the EDoS-Shield 
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Figure 6.8: Response Time Comparison before and after Using the EDoS-Shield 
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7 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Cloud computing is considered one of the hottest IT topics today. Many large 
organizations are interested in cloud computing because of its elasticity, pay per use, and 
other benefits that it provides. But regardless of its great advantages, the security of cloud 
computing is still in its infancy. Many new attacks have been developed especially for the 
cloud. 
In this work, we reviewed the literature to study the security of cloud computing. We 
surveyed the literature for the attacks that target the cloud computing, and proposed a 
taxonomy for these attacks based on cloud hierarchy level targeted by the attack. 
The DDoS attack was also studied in this work since it is the major cause of the EDoS 
attack, when transformed from conventional networks to cloud computing. A multi-
dimensional taxonomy for the DDoS attacks was also proposed in this work.  
After that, the EDoS attack was studied in detail. We surveyed the literature for the 
attacks that may result in an EDoS attack. We also provided a taxonomy for the EDoS 
attacks based on the way an attack may cause an EDoS attack. This taxonomy was 
proposed this may so that a single mitigation technique for an EDoS attack category may 
be used to block all the attacks under that category. The existing mitigation techniques 
for the EDoS attack were also reviewed. 
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The major part of this work is the design and implementation of an experimental testbed 
that was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique in 
blocking the EDoS attack.  
The experimental results of the testbed showed that the EDoS attack has a severe effect 
on the cloud, in terms of computing resources utilization and response time, if no 
mitigation technique is used. The results of the testbed confirmed those of the simulation 
in that as the EDoS attack rate increases, both the computing resources utilization and 
response time will increase too. The fluctuation in the response time increases as the 
EDoS attack rate increases. 
The EDoS-Shield was implemented on the testbed to evaluate its effectiveness. The 
results of the testbed show that when the EDoS-Shield is used, the EDoS attack traffic 
will be dropped by the firewall. The EDoS-Shield showed that it can greatly reduce the 
computing resources that will be allocated due to an attack. This in turn will save the 
cloud adopter from paying for computing resources reserved for an attack. The EDoS-
Shield also improved the response time significantly. 
Both the results of the testbed and the simulation are confirming each other in illustrating 
that the EDoS-Shield is capable of blocking the EDoS attack and provide significant 
economic savings to the cloud adopter. 
The ultimate completing of this work in the future is to implement the enhanced EDoS-
Shield in an experimental testbed and evaluate it. The enhanced EDoS-Shield is capable 
of detecting spoofed IP addresses that are used by malicious users pretending to be 
legitimate. 
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